
Determinants and constraints to effective procurement contract management in Uganda: a practitioner's perspective

Pross N. Oluka* and Benon C. Basheka

C/O Uganda Management Institute,
Plot 44-54, Jinja Road,
P.O. Box 20131 Kampala, Uganda
E-mail: nagittaoluka@gmail.com
E-mail: poluka@umi.ac.ug
E-mail: bbasheka@yahoo.co.uk
*Corresponding author

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants and constraints of effective contract management and its implications on service delivery since public procurement authority has persistently reported low compliance levels as far as contract management is concerned. Empirical research in this area is relatively sparse. Data was collected using a closed ended questionnaire. Significant predictors of determinants for effective contract management were: clear definition of processes and having in place contract management plans, appropriate methods of capturing key lessons from contract management process, accurate definition of roles and having a knowledgeable contract manager. While the major constraints were found to be: lack of political will to monitor contracts; inadequate capacity and lack of integrity. These findings offer a useful foundation for policy and practical improvement in this important area in Uganda.

Keywords: determinants; constraints; public procurement; service delivery; contract management; Uganda.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Oluka, P.N. and Basheka, B.C. (2014) 'Determinants and constraints to effective procurement contract management in Uganda: a practitioner's perspective', *Int. J. Logistics Systems and Management*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp.104–124.

Biographical notes: Pross N. Oluka is a Lecturer of Uganda Management Institute's MBA and MPA programmes. She has published broadly mainly in *International Journal of Production Economics*, *Journal of Public Procurement* and *International Journal of Business and Social Science*. She is also an accomplished procurement consultant.

Benon C. Basheka is Senior Lecturer and Head of Higher Degrees Department at the Uganda Management Institute. He has researched and published widely in the areas of public sector management, more specifically public procurement, supply chain management and logistics management.

1 Introduction

The goal of public procurement is to provide the required goods, services and works to the public (Davison and Sebastian, 2011; Errigde and McIlroy, 2002). However, extant literature alludes to several challenges in contract management. Ntayi et al. (2011) observes that millions of dollars get wasted in Uganda due to inefficient and ineffective obstacles and challenges in the procurement process of which contract management is a part. Ntayi et al. (2010a) suggest that on average, 65% of the central government recurrent non-wage is expended on procurement related items in Uganda. Eyaa and Oluka (2011) found that public procurement has always been a big part of the developing country's economy accounting for an estimated 9 to 13% of the developing nation's gross domestic product (GDP) and is therefore an area that warrants careful management. However, the above authors do not give the actual numerical figure of the millions lost at contract management stage. This could be attributed to the changing nature of corruption. A lot of laxity has been reported at the time of contract execution where both services and goods are not delivered on time, specifications are not being met as required and internal users complain of late deliveries (The 3rd National Integrity Survey Report, 2008; PPDA, 2009; Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, 2010). Meanwhile, contract management continues to receive less attention from policy makers and academics. The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (2009) guidelines observes that neither the COMESA Procurement Directive, nor the United Nations Commercial Trade Law Model (UNCITRAL) specifically address the subject of contract management. Researchers too are unable to empirically and systematically pinpoint the determinants and constraints by using objective 'hard data' (Davison and Sebastian, 2011; Jiang and Qureshi, 2006). In several countries, few articles have rigorously analysed and empirically tested the factors that actually affect a government agency's decision to manage contracts. Within the relatively scarce empirical evidence on contracting decisions and management (Davison and Sebastian, 2011; Boyne, 1998; Ferris and Graddy, 1986), there is little information on the effectiveness of contract management specific to public procurement Uganda inclusive. Conceptually, contract management has become a megatrend in many public entities especially as result of social accountability and increased demand of service delivery (World Bank Institute, 2011; Shetterly et al., 2012; Schiele, 2007; Swinney and Netessin, 2007). Contract management has been described by Rendon (2009) as having a grip in project monitoring and control. Stefanie et al. (2010) and Ntayi et al. (2010c) argue that contracts can provide the scaffold for the economic exchange, as long as the terms of the relationship is clear in terms of what is to be provided and the rights and obligations of parties to the contract thus minimising the potential for opportunistic behaviour.

Several theories explain the determinants and obstacles to effective contract management among which include; ethics, availability of skilled personnel and organisational influences among others (Rose-Ackermann, 2002). Organisational challenges in contract management draws lessons from organisational theory. Whereas researchers who work out dominant paradigms have been dismissive of organisation theory (Posner, 1993; Reder, 1999), the lens of contract management discloses the lessons of organisation theory that are obscured by the dominant paradigm which sometimes are fundamental. Williamson (2002) asserts that contracts are unavoidably incomplete, requiring parties to adapt to unanticipated disturbances that arise by reason of gaps, errors, and omissions in the original contract and realised at the time of

implementation. Such adaptations are especially consequential especially when self-interest which may be referred to as ‘frailty of motive’ as contended by Simon (1985). Human actors are not only confronted with needs to adapt to the unforeseen (by reason of bounded rationality) but are also confronted by strategic behaviour (by reason by opportunism). This may result in costly contractual breakdowns. When contracts are managed well, then such efforts would be unneeded more so when common knowledge of payoffs and costless bargaining are assumed. However, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Williamson (1985) argue that both of these are deeply problematic since non-verifiability problems are posed when bounded rationality, opportunism, and idiosyncratic knowledge are united (Williamson, 1975).

Proponents of transaction cost theory such as Brown et al. (2006) argue that costs arise because it is often impossible to have complete contracts, and giving rise to subsequent renegotiations when the balance of power between the transacting parties shifts. The agent/principal theory can also be applied this study. According to Chiappori and Salanie (2002), the underlying principle of the contract theory is that there should be a clear understanding of the needs of the principal and ability of the agent to meet these needs competently. The theory becomes relevant to the study as it highlights the need for strategic planning in procurement. When a procurement contract is well defined and planned, the principal (entities) and agents (suppliers) find it easy to meet needs of each other in an efficient way resulting into timely execution of the contract. The main challenge for the government in contract management is to properly appreciate its importance. Often procuring entities give full attention to the contract selection process, but then walk away from the procurement once the contractor is in place. On the other hand best value theory explains the relationship between the procuring entity and the provider. Much as the PDE expects the supplier to deliver right and quality goods, the supplier expects timely payment. However, the application of these theories to explain effective contract management is limited. In this study, we aimed at identifying the determinants and constraints to effective contract management in Uganda. The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner: Section 2 presents the research problem where an elaboration of the existing knowledge gaps to our understanding of contract management problems is examined. In Section 3, the paper reviews some existing literature; a task that is thematically addressed based on determinants and constraints. Section 4 is devoted to the methodology that was used in undertaking the study. Section 5 is for findings and discussions before we draw implications for both practice and policy.

2 The research problem

There is no much doubt that there has been growing interest in contract management in the developed world and hence the many studies of contracting and management (Rendon, 2008, 2009; Abi-Karam, 2001; Okeahalam and Oludele, 2003; Davison and Wright, 2004; Minahan, 2007; Ya Ni and Bretschneider, 2007). Despite the emphasis and regulatory framework on contract management, Uganda Public Procurement Compliance Reports sanctioned by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority have continuously shown contract management as one of the areas where performance of public entities is poor. According to the Baseline Survey Report on Public Procurement Systems in Uganda (PPDAA, 2010), there were significant variances between the actual and indicative time frames in the processing of procurements from the stage of approval

of procurement to the award and signing of contracts. Contractual payment period revealed that 29.5% of the procurements had a time variance against the contractual payment period as compared to 21.8% of the procurements that did not have a time variance and 48.7% of the procurements. For most contracts, there was no appointment of contract managers and no contract monitoring or supplier appraisal reports prepared. This cast doubts on contract management compliance which maybe hamper service delivery.

Studies addressing contracting in general are varied (Azom, 1999; Davison and Sebastian, 2009a, 2009b; Davison and Sebastian, 2009a) though not specific to the determinants and constraints in public procurement in Uganda. This cast doubt whether contract management stage is really taken seriously. If the likely determinants and constraints are ignored, public entities are more likely to suffer shocks that may even bring the institutions to their 'bended knees' and hence poor service delivery and deteriorating institutional reputation. This study sought to make a contribution by conducting an exploratory study that would form a basis for developing a model of the determinants and constraints to effective contract management specifically in public procurement. It is hoped that the findings will enable scholars and practitioners appreciate the factors and constraints that explain contract management in public entities in Uganda.

3 Literature review

3.1 Determinants of effective contract management

The prescriptive literature on contract management tends to offer step-by-step procedures for procurement managers and other stakeholders. In the process of ensuring that contract management successfully takes the right course, all the parties involved must keenly pay attention to all provisions in the contract (Sanders et al., 2007; Laratta, 2009; Saunders, 2000; Eyaa et al., 2010). Successful and efficient contract management practices must meet stakeholders' needs, achieves best value for money, manages the potential risks and liabilities and improves service delivery. Thus, enforcement of regulatory measures must be enforced to avoid pitfalls of inefficient contract management process and eventual poor service delivery. As a result, consideration should be given to address the questions in the procurement contract literature as to how the supplier can provide the buyer with sufficient flexibility while not assuming all the risk due to demand uncertainty (Golovachkina and Bradley, 2002). Equally pertinent is the need for trained personnel in contract management. In an effort to attain these demands, organisations constantly look for employees who have skills necessary to deal with the wide variety of tasks (Sauber et al., 2008). Notwithstanding the above, Lan et al. (2005) posit that finding, hiring and retaining dedicated, energetic, knowledgeable and ethical employees with special skills is always hard. Minahan (2007) observes that it is possible to design contracts that are robust to profitably continue operations in the face of expected deviations and unexpected disruptions. The foundation is a strong, stable supply network forged from good supply base management, strong supplier links, and continuous improvement and a corporate culture that embraces change and flexibility. But one may ask whether multi-stakeholder collaborations are important and how sustainable are they? While attending the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) Trainers of Trainers Workshop

held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25th July–5th August 2010, participants identified key issues that can influence contract management as follows:

Table 1 Practitioners' opinions on the determinants of successful contract management

<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
Putting in place structure and resources:	- Identifying and defining processes and a clear contract management plan, with a focus on outputs and milestones to performance - Method of regular assessment and evaluation
Ensuring the right people are in place to carry out the contract management activities	- The contract manager has a detailed knowledge of the contract. - The contract manager has the appropriate skills (both specific contract management skills and more general commercial awareness and expertise), with relevant training and development - Appropriate delegated authority to manage the contract effectively - Balanced contract management teams are setup, with an appropriate range of skills
Clear roles and responsibilities	- Clearly defining the responsibilities of the contract manager and the contractor supplier in a contract - A performance management framework is in place when the contract is signed - Service levels agreements are in place, understood by the supplier, and monitored by the contract manager and/or end users
Feedback and communications mechanisms	- Regular and routine feedback is given to suppliers on their performance - Users understand what the contract is intended to deliver - Variations well captured and considered as part of formal contract management processes - There are formal performance reviews with suppliers
Payment and incentives	- Ensuring payments are made to the supplier in line with the contract - The costs of the services delivered and contract management costs are mapped against budgets and allocated appropriately - Contract variations are made according to agreed contractual provisions
Managing risks	Identifying and anticipating risk such as service failure, reputation as, damage and additional costs

Source: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (2011)

Using the fore going framework, five determinants were derived as such: apportioning of resources; clear reporting lines, defining of roles and responsibilities, ensuring timely payments and managing of risks. Rendon (2010) further outlines critical success factors for contract management as being qualified workforce, clear processes, relationships, resources, leadership and policies all of which have an direct impact on an organisation's

contract management processes as well as resulting outcomes. We used the above framework to test their applicability in the procuring and disposal entities (PDEs) in Uganda's central government. The assumption was that countries operate in different political, legal, social economic and technological environments. Rendon and Snider (2008) cited in Rendon (2010) affirm that the quintessence of contract management evolves proper planning, award, and administration of contracts and the monitoring of providers' performance. Once this is deficient, it increases the risk of endangering value for money. Recently corruption has turned out to be one of the most challenging phenomena of our time that can easily make the process of contract management unsuccessful.

3.2 Constraints to effective contract management

A World Bank survey of government and civil representatives in the six developing countries confirmed that corruption is one of the greatest obstacles to successful contract management (Okeahalam and Oludele, 2003). The procurement function of an enterprise is for example one area that is targeted second most by fraudsters (Plavsic, 2004). Helsby and Kaizer (2003) contends that enterprises should do more to prevent fraud by actively evaluating and estimating the obstacles that maybe encountered in the process of execution and that these measures should be closely supported by ongoing monitoring. Corruption in Africa is significant, unabated and country specific, driven by conditions ripe for unaccountable and less than transparent behaviour. This assertion could probably explain Uganda's poor Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2009, 2010, 2011) as being as low as 2.5. Several authors have advanced theories explaining the prevalence of corruption in public (Basheka and Bisangabasaija, 2010; Oluka and Sennoga, 2008; Thai, 2008; Shah, 2006; Transparency International, 2007) among others. But none of the above authors explains constraints to contract management. A research study done by Cooper et al. (2000) indicates that the most significant fraud schemes occur in, or as part of, the procurement process partly because of the huge public procurement expenditure where money is exchanged through commercial bribery, kickbacks and other fraud arising from the process. Once this is done, then the likelihood of 'air' supply and delivery of substandard goods can be very high (Coronel and Kalaw-Tirol, 2002).

McCrudden (2004) highlights factors such as delayed funding from the government, bureaucracy in the procurement system and poor capacity of local contractors contributing hence hurting service delivery. In Uganda, funds are released only when an entity has met the basic accountability requirements and when there is money in the treasury. All this makes it almost impossible for the service providers to do their work effectively and in the shortest time possible and hence makes it hard for them to meet the scheduled deadlines. Abi-Karam (2001) too suggests six types of constraints: proposal writing, surety and liability schedule, contractual, performance and price constraints. Buchanan (2001) argues that whatever the rules of the game, the lens of contract and its eventual management must usefully be brought to bear on the play of the game. The author admits that contract management entails efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align incentives and craft governance structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs and due allowance being made for the mitigation of contractual hazards.

Table 2 General practitioners' view on the possible contract management and monitoring constraints

<i>Country</i>	<i>Constraints</i>
Rwanda	1 Information not easily accessible to all stakeholders
	2 Contract monitoring mainly covers the implementation phase and not the previous phases
	3 Lack of appropriate monitoring skills and capacity of those responsible for monitoring
	4 Lack of appropriate monitoring work-plans and methodologies
	5 Lack of appropriate stakeholders involvement in contract monitoring
Zambia	1 Poor quality of disclosure
	2 Some laws do not allow full disclosure of information
	3 Lack of clarity of government commitment on monitoring contracts
	4 Limited advocacy space
	5 Inadequate capacity of stakeholders
Tanzania	1 Lack of access to information
	2 Lack of political will to monitor implementation
	3 Weak Civil Society Organisations base with little capacity to monitor
	4 Corruption and conflict of interest
	5 Lack of capacity within the industry to negotiate and monitor contracts
Kenya	1 Lack of transparency in information and poor record keeping
	2 Poor identification of needs/implementation
	3 Citizen apathy/lack of awareness
	4 Inadequate witness protection/consequences management
	5 Lack of common framework for monitoring
Uganda	1 Lack of access to information on contracts
	2 Limited knowledge on contract management
	3 Lack of capacity
	4 Weak enforcement of existing laws
	5 Lack of ownership with processes
	6 Lack of Integrity
	7 Fear to speak out
	8 Lack of confidence/trust in the system
	9 Weak Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and media – general lack of appropriate capacity of various stakeholders (media, CSO, implementers, monitors)
	10 Limited public/community interest and participation

Source: World Bank Institute (2011) available at <http://api.ning.com/files/>

In World Bank Institute (2011), organised a contract monitoring action planning workshop for East and Southern Africa from 31 May to 3 June 2011 in Kampala, Uganda. One of the objective of this workshop was to build a common understanding of the current reality of contract monitoring in the region given the fact that the World

Bank's new Africa Regional Strategy places social accountability in a central focus and specifically mentions contract watch as one of the key accountability tools. The workshop was attended by close to 70 participants from the private sector, civil society and government drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia. Each country had its own priority sectors represented at the meeting, notably construction and extractive industries. Cognisant of the variance in country contexts, country group discussions were held and identified the five most challenging issues associated with contract management and monitoring in each country. Uganda being the host had more participants and was divided into two groups. We assume that the opinions were enlisted freely and openly without prejudice. The results were as follows in Table 2.

Eight broad emergent themes of constraint were derived as listed below. Lack of access to information; weak legal framework; Lack of political will to monitor contracts; lack of whistle blower protection in case of suspected corruption; limited stake holder involvement/participation; lack of integrity in the procurement process; lack of capacity in contract management and monitoring and lack of holistic approach to contract monitoring.

It can be observed that the views are divergent but with some similarities. We adopted the above arguments in the study so as to confirm or reject the argument from a purely practitioners' view point and to encourage procurement professionals to acknowledge and devise strategies for managing all these complex constraints. This is supported by Lamoureux (2006) who asserts that true resilience from supply challenges comes from attacking supply chain constraints from all the angles and having operational, tactical, and strategic plan. The professionals must be seen as champions of efficiency and effectiveness and must acknowledge the challenges and their various forms, and their sources. In the previously published research, Davison and Sebastian (2009a) established the likelihood of contract problems for a given type of contract, and which type of contract was likely to encounter the most problems. It is, however, now increasingly accepted that 'one size does not fit all' when it comes to designing contract management strategies to support a wide range of products with different characteristics. However, Chopra (2005) observes that many shortcomings in the contract management process occur because the buyer and the supplier are two different entities, each trying to optimise its own profits thus hurting service delivery.

4 Methodology

This study was exploratory intended to validate the determinants and constraints of contract management in public sector organisations of Uganda. Exploratory design was used so as to formulate a problem for more precise investigation from an operational point of view as supported by Kothari (2004). The major emphasis was to discover ideas and insights. Sekaran (2003, p.119) posits that exploratory studies are undertaken when not much is known about the situation at hand, or no information is available. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (2011) and World Bank Institute (2011) framework in conjunction with a comprehensive literature base gave foundation upon which our assumptions and argument was developed. The idea was to use the above framework to confirm or reject the argument from a purely practitioners' view point. The exploratory research took the form of:

- 1 review of available literature
- 2 expert surveys
- 3 analysis of case studies
- 4 pilot studies.

Given the infancy of the subject in the field of public procurement, we reviewed extensive international literature and case studies on success stories for contract management.

A quantitative approach was used though largely descriptive. It relied on responses from procurement professionals, Contract Committee members, heads of departments or heads of sections. The sample of respondents for this survey was suitable due to their relevance to the focus and purpose of the study (Creswell, 2003; Neumann, 2003). The aim was to build theory (Forza, 2002) about contract management in Uganda. A self administered questionnaire was used and the reliability alpha of the survey instrument for the 78 items was very high (0.98). Out of the total population of 200 respondents, 120 were sampled for the study. Of the expected 120 respondents, 96 returned the filled survey instrument, representing almost 80% response rate. Data was analysed descriptively where we used percentages and frequency distributions. We also conducted an exploratory factor analysis to determine the major constraints to contract management in Uganda.

5 Findings and discussions

The questionnaire asked a number of background questions, including: education and experience of the respondent; and current position and contracting responsibilities. Our analysis confirms that the majority of the respondents 49 (51.0%) were from the procurement and disposal unit, 14 (14.6%) from the contracts committee, 13 (13.5%) from the heads of department and 11 (11.5%) from the heads of section and others were 9 (9.4%). The highest number of respondents 52 (54.2%) had served in the organisation for less than five years and very few 4 (4.2%) for more than 15 years. Majority 46 (47.9%) of the respondents were post graduates and 34 (35.4%) were degree holders. This means that the entities have a highly qualified group of employees and quite experienced in procurement related issues. We were concerned with examining the major determinants and constraints to effective Procurement Contract Management in Uganda. Using the framework described in the previous sections, we enlisted responses using a five-Likert scale of strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree. In Table 3, the descriptive results on the extent to which structure and resources are a determinant of compliance to contract management are presented. We then analysed respondent's perceptions on the major determinants to effective contract management. Table 3 presents the summary of the findings on the structural and process constraints.

Table 3 Structure and resources

<i>Items</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>
Structures and resources to manage contracts	45 (46.9%)	40 (41.7%)	1 (1.0%)	2 (2.1%)	8 (8.3%)	4.17
Define processes and a clear contract management plan	43 (44.8%)	43 (44.8%)	1 (1.0%)	4 (4.2%)	5 (5.2%)	4.20
Align organisational governance processes, and risk structures	34 (35.2%)	48 (50.0%)	4 (4.2%)	3 (3.1%)	7 (7.3%)	4.03
Regular assessment and evaluation are usually in place	38 (39.6%)	43 (44.8%)	4 (4.2%)	4 (4.2%)	7 (7.3%)	4.05
Methods of capturing key data and lessons from contract management process	46 (47.9%)	37 (38.5%)	5 (5.2%)	2 (2.1%)	6 (6.3%)	4.20
Holding customers accountable for proper requirements	44 (45.8%)	35 (36.5%)	8 (8.3%)	1 (1.0%)	7 (7.3%)	3.99
Clear requirements/clear statement of work/terms of references	29 (30.2%)	47 (49.0%)	9 (9.4%)	4 (4.2%)	7 (7.3%)	4.14
Proper technical review of requirements before assignment to contract specialists	45 (46.9%)	40 (41.7%)	1 (1.0%)	2 (2.1%)	8 (8.3%)	3.91

A comparative analysis of the mean scores for all the above items suggests a relatively high ranking of all the measures of structure and resources. The highest mean score of 4.20 computed on the basis of a five-Likert scale confirms that the key determinants: defining processes and formulating a clear contract management plan and appropriate methods of capturing key data and lessons from contract management process. These are the two major structural and process determinants to lack of effective contract management. Proper technical review of requirements before assignment to contract specialists had the least ranking from respondents of 3.91 with a standard deviation of 8. These findings confirm the existing information in the literature. Brown and Potoski (2003) further argues that though defining the contract terms is crucial contract management plan should be developed early in the process, and must explicitly state the deliverables that will be created through a joint effort between the contractor and the client and must decide what will constitute success. Bolton (2006) asserts that lack of data collection and records by organs of state prevents the effective monitoring targeted on the transparency of the tendering process of which contract management is a part. Structures cannot work alone without other support functions. We thus examined the extent to which human resource factors could be a determinant to effective contract management in Uganda.

Table 4 Ensuring the right people are in place

<i>Items</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>
The contract manager usually has a detailed knowledge of the contract	38 (39.6%)	43 (44.8%)	5 (5.2%)	8 (8.3%)	2 (2.1%)	4.11
The contract manager has the appropriate skills	44 (45.8%)	35 (36.5%)	4 (4.2%)	4 (4.2%)	8 (8.3%)	4.08
job descriptions, and roles must be defined accurately	42 (43.8%)	40 (41.7%)	5 (5.2%)	3 (3.1%)	6 (6.3%)	4.14
Clear objectives and reporting lines and performance	36 (37.5%)	42 (43.8%)	9 (9.4%)	4 (4.2%)	4 (4.2%)	4.07
The contract manager must have appropriate delegated authority	34 (35.4%)	44 (45.8%)	7 (7.3%)	5 (5.3%)	6 (6.3%)	3.99
Crucial to manage the physical contract and setting a realistic timetable	35 (36.6%)	42 (43.8%)	11 (11.5%)	1 (1.0%)	7 (7.3%)	4.01
Good records keeping is critical and contracts must be accessible when required	40 (41.7%)	39 (40.6%)	8 (8.3%)	3 (3.15)	6 (6.3%)	4.08
Use of contract management information technology for recording key information	42 (43.8%)	37 (38.5%)	7 (7.3%)	3 (3.1%)	7 (7.3%)	4.08
Regular ad hoc reporting of contract management information is a must	35 (36.5%)	36 (37.5%)	9 (9.4%)	9 (9.4%)	6 (6.3%)	3.89
Mechanisms should be in place for handling disputes	40 (41.7%)	38 (39.6%)	8 (8.3%)	4 (4.25)	6 (6.3%)	4.06

The most rated human resource management factors were:

- 1 job descriptions and roles which must be defined accurately
- 2 the contract manager must be knowledgeable of the contract.

Rendon (2010) rightly observed that some of the critical success factors for both project and contract management is having qualified workforce, clear processes, relationships, resources, leadership and policies all of which have an direct impact on an organisation's project management and contract management processes as well as resulting outcomes. Most developing countries, however, lack trained procurement personnel; a fact that may add to the contract management problems.

Effective communications between the contract managers was the most influential factor in developing strong internal and external relationships. This is evidenced by the highest mean of 4.14 and standard deviation of 2. This was followed by supplier performance using clear, objective and meaningful metrics. This item had a mean of 4.11 and standard deviation of 5. Ross and Goulding (2007) argue that contract management must support the attainment of mutual interests especially parties must agree to behave responsibly rather than seeking individual gains. This may entail distributing copies of contracts between all stakeholders for effective contract monitoring and control.

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2004) observes that promoting better access to information for all stakeholders strengthens the accountability of all actors to local development goals as well as to other actors and stakeholders.

Table 5 developing strong internal and external relationships

<i>Feedback and communication mechanisms</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>
The contract manager must understand his/her own role	41 (42.7%)	39 (40.6%)	3 (3.1%)	4 (4.2%)	7 (7.3%)	4.10
The respective responsibilities of the contract manager	35 (36.5%)	43 (44.8%)	10 (10.4%)	1 (1.0%)	7 (7.3%)	4.02
Well defined regular structured	36 (37.5%)	40 (41.7%)	10 (10.4%)	6 (6.3%)	4 (4.2%)	4.02
There should be clear understanding of expectations	33 (34.4%)	48 (50.0%)	8 (8.3%)	1 (1.0%)	6 (6.5%)	4.05
Effective communications between the contract manager	35 (36.5%)	47 (49.0%)	6 (6.3%)	5 (5.2%)	2 (2.1%)	4.14
Regular and routine feedback is given to suppliers on their performance	44 (45.8%)	33 (34.4%)	8 (8.3%)	5 (5.2%)	6 (6.3%)	4.08
Both parties should understand the service they are required to deliver based on contract	45 (46.9%)	31 (32.3%)	7 (7.3%)	4 (4.2%)	9 (9.4%)	4.03
A performance management framework is in place by the time contract is signed	43 (44.8%)	33 (34.4%)	8 (8.3%)	4 (4.2%)	7 (7.3%)	4.06
Service levels agreements should be in place and are linked to business needs	41 (42.7%)	35 (36.5%)	11 (11.5%)	4 (4.2%)	5 (5.2%)	4.07
Supplier performance should be assessed using clear, objective and meaningful metrics	41 (42.7%)	39 (40.6%)	7 (7.3%)	4 (4.2%)	5 (5.2%)	4.11
There are formal performance reviews with suppliers, with documented improvement plans	37 (38.5%)	38 (39.6%)	10 (10.4%)	6 (6.3%)	5 (5.2%)	4.00
Clear processes are in place to handle operational problem resolution and resolve issues	29 (30.2%)	43 (44.8%)	11 (11.5%)	8 (8.3%)	5 (5.2%)	3.86
Where appropriate, user compliance with the contract is monitored and managed	35 (36.5%)	37 (38.5%)	13 (13.5%)	5 (5.2%)	6 (6.3%)	3.94
Parties must understand the service they are required to deliver based on contract	34 (35.4%)	38 (39.6%)	8 (8.3%)	8 (8.3%)	8 (8.3%)	3.85
Changes in user requirements are captured and considered as part of formal change	34 (35.4%)	37 (38.5%)	16 (16.7%)	4 (4.2%)	5 (5.2%)	3.95

Table 6 Payment and incentives

	<i>SA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>
Ensuring payments are made to the supplier in line with the contract	29 (30.2%)	40 (41.7%)	10 (10.4%)	12 (12.5%)	5 (5.2%)	3.79
The costs of the services delivered and contract management costs are mapped	31 (32.3%)	40 (41.7%)	12 (12.5%)	10 (10.4%)	3 (3.1%)	3.90
Contract variations are made using contractual provisions	25 (26.0%)	40 (41.7%)	18 (18.8%)	8 (8.3%)	5 (5.2%)	3.75
The contract manager takes action where necessary to avoid the price escalation	35 (36.5%)	36 (37.5%)	9 (9.4%)	12 (12.5%)	4 (4.2%)	3.90
PDEs always ensure that advance payments are made only where applicable	33 (34.4%)	36 (37.5%)	14 (14.6%)	7 (7.3%)	6 (6.3%)	3.86
PDEs always ensure that an advance payment security	30 (31.3%)	37 (38.5%)	14 (14.6%)	8 (8.3%)	7 (7.3%)	3.78
PDEs always ensure that stage payment linked to specific deliverables stated	29 (30.2%)	44 (45.8%)	11 (11.5%)	6 (6.3%)	6 (6.3%)	3.88
PDEs always ensure that individual payments do not exceed the cost	33 (34.5%)	44 (45.8%)	8 (8.3%)	6 (6.3%)	5 (5.2%)	3.98
PDEs always ensure that individual payments do not exceed the cost	37 (38.5%)	37 (38.5%)	13 (13.5%)	4 (4.2%)	5 (5.2%)	4.01
PDEs always ensure obtaining a payment security if during the delivery of the works	30 (31.3%)	40 (41.7%)	13 (13.5%)	9 (9.4%)	4 (4.2%)	3.86
PDEs always ensure that regular interim payments are based on general progress	34 (35.4%)	41 (42.7%)	7 (7.3%)	8 (8.3%)	6 (6.3%)	3.93
PDEs always ensure that retained payments are linked to specific contract events	40 (41.7%)	37 (38.5%)	6 (6.3%)	6 (6.3%)	6 (6.3%)	4.04

Respondents were asked whether payments and incentives were critical determinant to contract management. The key variable was ensuring retained payments are linked to specific contract deliverables. This item scored a mean of 4.04 with a standard deviation

of 6. This was followed ensuring that individual payments do not exceed the cost. Notwithstanding the above, Davison and Sebastian (2009a) argues that the above will depend on the nature of the contract. They further illustrate that construction contracts, are more likely to encounter cost overruns due to changes in existing designs and inflation. For the contractor the challenge is to perform the work in a satisfactory manner and to obtain timely payment for the effort. In this regard, the contractor takes the risk that the government will delay necessary approvals or fail to pay on time. An experienced contractor will add some measure of protection for this risk in its contract price, even if it becomes slightly less competitive as a result. In Table 7, we summarise the findings on the constraints to effective contract management.

Table 7 Constraints to effective contract management

	<i>SA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>SD</i>
Lack of access to information regarding the contract	35 (36.5%)	28 (29.2%)	14 (14.6%)	9 (9.4%)	9 (9.4%)
Weak legal framework to blacklist inefficient firms	27 (28.1%)	35 (36.5%)	14 (14.6%)	13 (13.5%)	7 (7.3%)
Lack of political will to monitor contracts	23 (24.0%)	30 (31.3%)	20 (20.8%)	11 (11.5%)	12 (12.5%)
Lack of whistle blower protection	30 (30.3%)	26 (27.1%)	18 (18.8%)	14 (14.6%)	8 (8.3%)
Limited stake holder involvement in monitoring contracts	33 (34.4%)	32 (33.3%)	13 (13.5%)	9 (9.4%)	9 (9.4%)
Lack of integrity in the contract management process	38 (39.6%)	22 (22.9%)	17 (17.7%)	13 (13.5%)	6 (6.3%)
Lack of capacity in contract management and monitoring of various stakeholders	29 (30.2%)	27 (28.1%)	20 (20.8%)	10 (10.4%)	10 (10.4%)
Lack of reliable, un costly dispute resolution mechanisms	24 (25.0%)	34 (35.4%)	20 (20.8%)	10 (10.4%)	8 (8.3%)
Users may specify wrong products	29 (30.2%)	27 (28.1%)	14 (14.6%)	13 (13.5%)	13 (13.5%)
the contractor may fail to deliver the required items	27 (28.1%)	30 (31.3%)	16 (16.7%)	11 (11.5%)	12 (12.5%)
Poor relationship to the procurement process and the criteria for successful contracting	27 (28.1%)	25 (26.0%)	20 (20.8%)	15 (15.6%)	8 (8.3%)
Ambiguous cost overrun due to inflation	27 (28.1%)	34 (35.4%)	14 (14.6%)	11 (11.5%)	10 (10.4%)
Flexibility with regulations too burdensome	32 (33.3%)	34 (35.4%)	14 (14.6%)	9 (9.4%)	7 (7.3%)
Specific interpretation of regulations	28 (29.2%)	37 (38.5%)	9 (9.4%)	13 (13.5%)	9 (9.4%)
Compliance with established deadlines	27 (28.1%)	36 (37.5%)	12 (12.5%)	13 (13.5%)	8 (8.3%)
Compliance with regulations, statues, and congressional mandates	31 (32.3%)	35 (36.5%)	14 (14.6%)	7 (7.3%)	9 (9.4%)
Lack of regular follow up	27 (28.1%)	37 (38.5%)	14 (14.6%)	10 (10.4%)	8 (8.3%)

Respondents were requested to score their opinions on deterrents to effective contract management and the following were the results. 66 (68.7%) of the respondents agreed that there the regulations were too burdensome. This finding is supported by Van Weele (2005) who asserts that public procurement guidelines are unnecessarily bureaucratic. Behavioural irregularities could possibly explain this phenomenon as proposed by Selznick (1950) of which bureaucratisation is one for which stakeholders should be alerted and thereafter factored into the organisational design. This was followed by limited stakeholder involvement in the contract management process 65 (67.7%), interpretation of regulations 65 (67.7%); lack of follow-up 64 (66.6%) and lack of compliance with regulations 66 (65.8%). Gelderman et al. (2006) observes that the finding above could be attributed to lack of professionalism and familiarity with procurement laws. However, Eyaa and Oluka (2011) surprisingly found out that professionalism was not a significant predictor of compliance. Non-compliance costs tax payers a lot of money through shoddy work resulting in poor service delivery and the quality of life in the country. Respondents agreed that there was lack of access to information regarding the contract 63 (65.7%).

Table 8 Factor analysis on the constraints to effective contracts management

<i>Component items</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Component 1</i>			
1 Flexibility with regulations too burdensome	0.73		
2 Ambiguous cost overrun due to inflation	0.73		
3 Users may specify wrong products	0.71		
4 The contractor may fail to deliver the require items	0.67		
5 Poor relationship to the procurement process and the criteria for successful contracting	0.67		
6 Compliance with regulations, statuses and congressional mandates	0.64		
7 Lack of regular follow up	0.60		
<i>Component 2</i>			
8 Lack of political will to monitor contracts		0.82	
9 Weak legal framework to blacklist inefficient firms		0.65	
10 Lack of whistle blower protection in case of suspected corruption		0.64	
<i>Component 3</i>			
11 Lack of capacity in contract management and monitoring of various stakeholders			0.76
12 Lack of integrity in the contract management process			0.75
13 Lack of reliable, uncostly, dispute resolution mechanisms			0.73

All the variables which were used to measure the constraints were subjected to exploratory factor analysis. Initially, we had a total of 18 items but after factor analysis, these were reduced to only 13 items with a total variance of 63%. The data was adequate for factor analysis as confirmed from the KMO of 0.84 which was higher than the recommended 0.6. The Bartlett's test of sphericity of also high with an approximate chi-square of 663.916 (df = 91 and sig. = 0.000). The items loaded on three principle

components where the first component had 7 items with a variance of 47% followed by the second principle with 9% and the third had a total variance of 7%. Each component was associated with factor loadings that indicated the strengths of a major factor. From the above analysis, the major constraints to effective contract management include:

- 1 lack of political will to monitor contracts
- 2 lack of capacity in contract management and monitoring of various stakeholders
- 3 lack of integrity in the contract management process
- 4 lack of reliable, uncostly dispute resolution mechanisms
- 5 flexibility with regulations too burdensome
- 6 ambiguous cost overrun due to inflation.

The issue of delayed funding was supported by McCrudden (2004) finding that asserted that delayed funding from the government or the donors could also lead to poor service delivery. It should, however, be noted that both central and local governments depend on government and donors funds for all big projects yet the government grants are inconsistent. In Uganda, funds are only released only when an entity has met the basic accountability requirements and when there is money in the treasury. All this makes it almost impossible for the buying entities to do their work effectively and in the shortest time meet the scheduled deadlines.

6 Conclusions, implications, limitations and future research

The study has identified major determinants and constraints to effective contract management. Most of our findings confirm what has been documented in the literature of the developed countries. These findings the findings raise a number of implications at a theoretical, managerial and policy level if contract management is to be improved. Among the major determinants to effective contract management were: defining processes and formulating a clear contract management plan, designing appropriate methods of capturing key data and lessons from contract management process. Others were human resource management factors that related to job descriptions, accurate definition of roles and diverse contract management knowledge. We argue that procurement staff needs to offer technical advice to the accounting officers on the appropriate contract management framework and the kind of people that ought to be in charge. However, all stakeholders have a critical role and this has to be integrated into annual plans of each entity. The Regulatory Authority (PPDAA) and the public entities especially user department should work together to improve contract management through capacity building. This can be done through taking procurement skills assessment and training staff through refresher courses, workshops, seminars and conferences where staff meet and share experiences.

As far as constraints are concerned, the findings point to areas that need urgent policy and managerial attention. The major constraints like lack of political will to monitor contracts, lack of capacity in contract management and monitoring of various stakeholders, lack of integrity in the contract management process, lack of reliable records, costly dispute resolution mechanisms, flexibility with regulations too

burdensome, and ambiguous cost overrun due to inflation are matters of policy that ought to address constraints. For example, government ministries, private sector and CSO need to engage with each other so that their voices are heard or taken seriously by policy makers at all levels of the contract management process. The coalition-building approach will enable the three parties – government, private sector and CSO to find areas of common interest where no single individual or company would otherwise be willing to unilaterally apply more irresponsible standards of behaviour. Citizens too should be compelled to hold government officials accountable through social accountability movements. However this will depend if the guardians are honest and with integrity. The UNICITRAL law model and COMESA procurement guidelines should address the contract management process in greater detail.

Our study is limited by a number of factors. First and foremost, we only focused on central government entities in Kampala and not local government entities. Studies in future could attempt to carry out a comparative study of both the local and central government entities. Secondly, the study focused on categories of employees like contracts committee members, procurement unit personnel, and members of user departments whose activities affect public procurement in public entities. Studies carried out on contract management in the public sector should take into account other respondents whose decisions and activities impact on contract management in the public procurement process such as vendors. The third limitation of the study was that the study only focused on only determinants and constraints yet there are a number of factors like social norms, subjective norms, to mention but a few that can effective contract management in Uganda. Future researchers can focus on looking at the other critical success factors other than the ones mentioned in the paper.

Acknowledgements

We wish to extend our gratitude to the editorial team of *IJLSM* and the anonymous reviewer(s) for all the time and effort that they rendered to enable us improve on this work.

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